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I’ve spent more than two decades now, working at the intersection of technology and
news. Where I tried to be a clear-eyed observer of the extraordinary changes we’ve
witnessed in that period. And in the service of driving change -- strategically and
operationally -- across large organizations.
It has required constant agility. An ability to absorb new technologies, new consumer
behavior, new business patterns, and adapt rapidly. And 20-plus years in, the
landscape has hardly settled. If anything the pace of change is accelerating -challenging, in some pretty profound ways, our ability to adapt.
I think it is something to keep in mind over the course of the conference. Academic
study and curriculum development tend to move, for good reason, at a somewhat
deliberate pace. But the problem you’re addressing is complex, dynamic and fast
changing. And the way you think about it, the way you address it, will need to keep
pace.
If I can be of value this morning it is to provide some context for the subject of this
conference. And I hope to do that by addressing the broader forces operating on what
we call news literacy; and in particular what I see as the critical role of Google,
Facebook, Apple, and possibly Amazon in addressing this issue.
So what’s the problem we’re tackling when we talk about news literacy?
While one could certainly make an argument for earlier historical antecedents, news
literacy, as we use the term today, can be traced back to the rise of the Internet, which
opened the floodgates on access to information.
Although it took some time to acquire momentum, in pretty short order everyone had the
capacity publish and, importantly, to disseminate information . If there are any remaining
barriers at this point, they are institutional and cultural, not technological.
A couple of things happened along the way.
Established institutions -- government and media in particular -- lost their stranglehold
on the dissemination and distribution of information -- and with it their role in
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establishing a shared set of facts from which we drew a wider understanding of the
world around us.
This wasn’t supposed to be a bad thing. Putting aside for the moment the
business-model implications, the democratization of content creation and distribution, in
theory at least, opened us to a much wider range of voices and viewpoints than ever
before. Communities that struggled to find their way into the mass media, suddenly had
a platform and could build an audience of interested individuals.
By 2003 or 2004, for example, the most valuable source of information on the
development of the Internet and the changing state of the news industry, at least for me,
was not the New York Times -- it was the collection of blog posts that came to me in my
RSS feed.
There were some early warning signs that this might not be all good:
In this emergent environment, particularly once we moved beyond the big, branded,
destination or portal stage of the Internet, propaganda, public relations, rank
speculation, fiction, opinion, and news all lived side by side. And with time, as tools
became more sophisticated, the physical appearance of these various sources of
information became harder to distinguish.
Less obvious at the time -- certainly not until the rise of social media -- was the potential
of this new found egalitarianism to not only blur the lines between different sources of
content. But more profoundly, to erode our ability to drive any kind of national
consensus -- and with it a sense of social cohesion that allowed us to thrive despite
political differences.
Mainstream media may have been hegemonic and monolithic. But it also gave us a
common set of assumptions from which to work.
That’s a very abbreviated view of how we arrived at the point we find ourselves now.
Broadly speaking, the practice of what we call news literacy is premised on these
developments.
And with it -- crucially -- and this should not be underestimated in the current
environment -- comes the assumption not only that conscientious news consumers can
be taught to navigate this fuzzy terrain -- but that, given the right intellectual tools, they
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will naturally and inevitably embrace an enlightened, scientific, fact-based view of the
world.
But what if that’s simply not the case? Or not as broadly embraced as we would wish.
Then what?
At the very least then, we’re forced to consider that the root of the problem is deeper
and may be tied to a host of considerations that have little to do with our ability to
discern reported fact from opinion or propaganda. But more to do with larger political
and cultural forces that have gradually shaped the way we absorb and interpret
information.
Among the most obvious are:
● A growing political polarization that can be traced to a variety of factors from
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, which opened the spigots on
big-money influence over elections; to a pattern of gerrymandering, which has
tended to reduce the competitiveness of congressional elections and harden
positions on the right and left.
● An atrophy of middle class opportunity and growing sense of dislocation that
has accompanied the maturing of American capitalism and rise of globalization.
● A growing disenchantment with government and other large institutions,
some of it organic, much of it actively promoted from the right.
● And a host of changes in the wider media landscape that extend well beyond
the Internet; from the rise of cable and with it a greater segmentation of content
and audience -- exhibit A probably being the rise of Fox News; to the blending of
entertainment and news and with it, arguably, an attendant decline in rational
discourse that Neil Postman as far back as 1985 associated with the shift from
print to television as a dominant medium of mass communication.
The point being simply that there are a wider, more entrenched, longstanding set of
forces that -- coincident with the rise of the Internet -- have profoundly affected the way
we take in information about the surrounding world and ultimately make decisions as
citizens.
Kurt Anderson, the American journalist and author, in the current issue of the Atlantic, in
fact maintains that Americans are uniquely susceptible to the forces acting upon us now

4

because, he argues, the United States has always been prone to a certain kind of
magical thinking.
In the cover story of this month’s issue, How America Went Haywire, Anderson writes:
America was created by true believers and passionate dreamers, and by
hucksters and their suckers, which made America successful—but also by a
people uniquely susceptible to fantasy, as epitomized by everything from Salem’s
hunting witches to Joseph Smith’s creating Mormonism, from P. T. Barnum to
speaking in tongues, from Hollywood to Scientology to conspiracy theories, from
Walt Disney to Billy Graham to Ronald Reagan to Oprah Winfrey to Trump.
Anderson says he first noticed a more pronounced lurch toward fantasy around 2004,
perhaps not so coincidentally around the time that Bush’s political mastermind Karl
Rove began speaking about the ability to create our own reality and that Stephen
Colbert first coined the term truthiness.
And he traces the current triumph of what he ultimately brands The Fantasy Industrial
Complex to a whole variety of forces including the rise a certain brand of cultural
relativism in academia and on American college campuses generally.
Importantly for this conversation, though, he argues that the accelerant that has
propelled things to their current state of affairs is indeed the Internet.
Before the web, he writes, cockamamy ideas and outright falsehoods could not
spread nearly as fast or as widely, so it was much easier for reason and
reasonableness to prevail. Before the web, institutionalizing any one alternate
reality required the long, hard work of hundreds of full-time militants. In the digital
age, however, every tribe and fiefdom and principality and region of
Fantasyland—every screwball with a computer and an internet
connection—suddenly had an unprecedented way to instruct and rile up and
mobilize believers, and to recruit more. False beliefs were rendered both more
real-seeming and more contagious, creating a kind of fantasy cascade in which
millions of bedoozled Americans surfed and swam.
If the Internet accelerated these tendencies, the problem appears to have suddenly
metastasized over the past 12 months. What with concerns about the proliferation of
fake news in our social feeds, worries about Russian manipulation of the election, and
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the triumph of Donald Trump, who in many ways is the physical embodiment of the very
issues that news literacy seeks to address.
Trump is many things. But he’s a first and foremost a kind of media savant who seems
to have a visceral grasp of how to manipulate the medium, playing on or even feeding
the fake news phenomenon to play on the most deeply rooted fears and fantasies of at
least a certain portion of the electorate.
We don’t know yet whether in shattering, at least momentarily, many of the norms and
conventions of social, political and diplomatic discourse -- in challenging our most basic
assumptions about truth -- whether he has permanently altered the way we think about
fact and fiction in political life; or whether he represents a unique and aberrant reaction
in a moment in time. We’ll simply have to see.
What does seem certain, is the profound importance of the continued evolution of the
Internet and in particular, at this moment, the rise of the information platforms -principally Facebook and Google -- but also Apple and Amazon.
True, anyone can publish these days, but increasingly, Google and Facebook play a
dominant role in determining what we actually see. Their search results and news feeds
are the modern equivalent of the front page -- establishing at least in part how we
perceive the most important issues of the day.
Facebook in particular, but Twitter too -- because they are organized around the
preferences of the individual and their followers -- allow for an unprecedented
segmentation of thought and experience, that whether by intention or not, risks
consigning us to information ghettos -- or what we’ve somewhat more benignly termed
thought bubbles.
Add to that the fact that they are first and foremost personal entertainment platforms
that also happen to be purveyors of news and you see a kind of doubling down on the
blending of different forms of content that makes Neil Postman’s concerns about mixing
news and entertainment seem almost quaint.
Finally, couple that with the fact that these platforms appear susceptible to an almost
invisible manipulation -- whether by determined partisans or even more worryingly by
malicious state actors -- and you begin to begin to see the magnitude of the problem.
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Collectively, I would term these factors an experience issue -- a question of how news
that originates from a wide variety of sources is filtered, mixed and presented to an
audience that uses these platforms for a wide array of functions, many of them wholly
unrelated to news.
When all of this began to loom as a public policy issue, it was initially met with a certain
indifference on the part of the platforms -- a kind of spam problem that surely good
engineering and a little concerted focus could solve.
Or, as concerns continued to mount, no more than a PR crisis to be contained.
Understandably perhaps. These platforms were conceived by their inventors as
instruments of social good -- albeit with a commercial purpose -- designed in Google’s
words “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible,” or in
Facebook’s recently revised mission statement to “give people the power to build
community and bring the world closer together.”
Couple that with a profound conviction that any unintended consequences of these
efforts can be addressed by better engineering and better use of data -- and you begin
to see why the platforms were at first reluctant to get deeply drawn into a discussion of
their role and responsibility in shaping an informed society.
Just behind what I call the experience issue, are two other even more profound
developments.
The first is our failure in the first twenty years of the Internet to find a convincingly
sustainable model for digital journalism -- particularly at the local level.
The basics of this story are well known. And I won’t belabor them here. But as
newspapers lost their near monopoly over the distribution of their content -- the bundle
of advertising, listings and news coverage that was the source of their market power
and profitability -- and crucially enabled them to support newsgathering at scale -- their
economics began to unravel.
At the local level, in particular, where newspapers played a unique role in providing the
manpower that bound communities together and held power to account -- we haven’t
really found a viable digital substitute.
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This unraveling takes time. But we’re approaching a point of real crisis -- with the
nation’s local newsgathering manpower having been cut – practically in half – over the
past twenty years. And we’re beginning to see the emergence, as Paul Farhi chronicled
in the Washington Post the other day, writing about East Palo Alto, of actual news
desserts.
Say what you will about the platforms control over our experience of news, if there’s
less and less going into their systems, there’s less and less coming out.
It’s easy to get into a blame game here. Afterall, Google and Facebook alone are
sucking up about 85 percent of new digital ad dollars -- leaving publishers to scrap over
the remains. But I don’t think this is a particularly productive line of attack.
Technology has profoundly disrupted an earlier and now increasingly antiquated and
costly method of information distribution -- just as, more than a century ago, earlier
forms of technology disrupted transportation. Complaints on the part of commercial
publishers that they are entitled to subsidies by the platform companies, to sustain a
sometimes only loosely held public mission, but also their prodigious profits -- while
understandable, are not terribly persuasive.
That does not mean, as a society, however, that we don’t have an imperative to address
the unintended consequences of that disruption and ensure, collectively and with the
support of the platforms -- who after all enjoy some of the highest valuations of any
industry -- that the news needs of an informed and democratic society be addressed.
The third big development that we’re witnessing is the rise of artificial intelligence.
The platforms not only command prodigious audience. They not only increasingly
control surfaces that define much of our experience of the world. They are sitting on
immense computing power and mountains of data that when combined at scale are
beginning to be harnessed to manage entire tasks that not too long ago were firmly
within the province of human beings.
Witness the advent of self-driving cars.
Or the music that flows out of Spotify Discover.
Or Google’s ability to translate a myriad of languages on the fly.
These are transformative developments -- and yet just the beginning of what we’re likely
to see in the years ahead.
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Go back then to what I said at the top of my remarks. That in 20+ years of working at
the intersection of technology and news -- I have never seen change occur at such a
ferocious pace. I feel certain, with AI gaining important momentum, that pace will only
continue to accelerate.
If you’re an engineer, the prospect of those advances may give you confidence that the
unintended consequences of technological development -- the fake news in our
Facebook feeds or the bogus clickbait ads that sully publishers news pages -- will be
easily eradicated.
More ominously, though, I worry that the further acceleration of technological change
will amplify the issues we’ve been discussing and -- importantly -- that rate of change
will outpace the ability of our social institutions -- governments, NGOs, academic
institutions and the like -- to react to these developments and maintain the checks and
balances that allow civil and democratic society to thrive.
We see it already -- whether in the inability of most media companies to adapt to the
technological changes that have swept their industries; or the struggle of journalism
programs to develop curricula that genuinely address the needs of their students; or the
difficulty that Congress, the courts and regulatory bodies have adapting to entirely new
ways doing business.
There’s some evidence that the platforms themselves are beginning to grapple with
these issues. The plight of the news business, now has the full attention of Facebook’s
and Google’s CEOs. And if nothing else, they are starting to feel the heat, particularly in
Europe, of simmering regulatory and antitrust enforcement, that compels them to sit up
and take notice.
But it would be unrealistic to count on them to address the wider forces at play here.
After all this is their business.
So how should we respond as concerned practitioners and scholars seeking to combat
a new kind of social illiteracy that threatens to undermine basic democratic norms?
I see three broad opportunities, or prongs of attack, two of which are your job:
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First is the continued development of academic programs that address the issue of
news literacy head-on by helping students develop the wherewithal to sort fact from
fiction -- a principal subject of this conference.
But simply educating students how to interpret and apply critical thinking skills to what
comes AT them may not be sufficient.
Ideally we don’t want to them to simply accept as inevitable and immutable what is
delivered in their feeds. But rather, as full-throated citizens to understand that they have
a right to expect more. That they’re entitled to a certain level of information that is the
bedrock an enlightened, informed and democratic society. This smacks of civics 101,
perhaps, but in today’s environment is worth reinforcing.
Second, at a moment of such profound technological and social change, it becomes
particularly important for journalism schools not simply to teach the craft of news
reporting, or instill news literacy in their students. But to aggressively research,
chronicle and measure the changes we’re experiencing. And to assess their impact on
individuals and society as a whole so that we have the needed ammunition to act on
this issue. And to do so at a pace commensurate with the changes we’re confronting.
Finally, and it certainly goes well beyond the scope of this convening, I would argue that
news organizations, foundations, academic institutions, regulators, and lawmakers
should engage the platforms in identifying ways that we can collectively ensure the
continued viability of serious fact-based news gathering at all levels of society -- and not
simply accept as a byproduct of technological advancement -- the loss of a critical pillar
of democracy.
None of this is easy, nor within the power of any single individual, program or institution
to bring about. And yet progress on all three fronts is crucial, if the efforts you are
putting into developing a more news literate culture are to have any real impact.
Democracy depends on it.

